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GEORGE R.R. MARTIN’S FAITH MILITANT IN MODERN
AMERICA1: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND A STATE’S
ABILITY TO DELEGATE POLICING POWERS TO PRIVATE
POLICE FORCES OPERATED BY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Andrew Gardner*

INTRODUCTION
Since the very founding of the United States, the complex relationship between
government and religion has troubled and concerned lawmakers.2 The Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was one of the first
attempts to help define and restrain the government’s roles in that nexus.3 Thomas
Jefferson, in a letter praising the Establishment Clause, famously wrote that the clause
“buil[t] a wall of separation between Church [and] State.”4 However, the extent of
the protections that the Establishment Clause was intended to provide is unclear, and
judges as well as legal scholars have struggled with interpreting the clause for years.5
In a 2019 case discussing Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Justice Samuel Alito
stated: “The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that ‘Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.’ While the concept of a
formally established church is straightforward, pinning down the meaning of a ‘law
respecting an establishment of religion’ has proved to be a vexing problem.”6 In one
1

See GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A FEAST FOR CROWS 601–03, 931–32 (Bantam Books
2014) (2005) (describing the reconstituted “Faith Militant”). In the fourth installment of his
bestselling fantasy series, George R.R. Martin wrote about a character striking a deal with
the head of a major religion that removed legal restrictions and allowed the religion to
militarize its members. Id. The newly armed and unrestricted faithful, the Faith Militant, used
the opportunity to begin enforcing law and order throughout the kingdom. See generally id.
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; BA & BS, College of Charleston,
2013. I would like to thank the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal staff for their tireless
efforts, my parents, Don and Luanne Gardner, and my partner, Felicia Dahn, for their constant
and unwavering support, and the late Professor Thomas Chorlton, whose wisdom and teachings
are a part of all my academic endeavors. All errors are my own.
2
See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 79 (2001).
3
See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1998) (discussing the Establishment Clause’s
limitations on both state and federal governments after ratification).
4
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 113–14 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854).
5
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080–81 (2019) (indicating
that the wording of the First Amendment created long-lasting interpretation issues).
6
Id. at 2079–80.
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of the first cases attempting to clarify the limitations of the Establishment Clause,
Everson v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court asserted:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.7
While Everson helped establish a baseline notion of what the Establishment Clause
meant to the courts, it did not give a clear answer for moving forward.8 Rather, it has
been necessary to develop tests and standards to help with case-by-case interpretations of the Establishment Clause as new challenges arise.9
When considering Establishment Clause issues, courts are often required to
examine government actions or delegations of power.10 One significant power that a
government typically holds is the power to protect and police its citizens.11 Despite the
importance of police powers to both state and federal government, policing in the
United States has not been immune to the growing trend of privatizing government
responsibilities.12 While the privatization of government functions in general has
7

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
See id. (stating the minimum of what the Court believes the Establishment Clause to
mean).
9
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (determining that since
there was no bright-line rule, Establishment Clause interpretations should be made after
weighing a series of factors developed by years of court rulings).
10
See, e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2079–80; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13; Everson, 330
U.S. at 15–16.
11
See M. Rhead Enion, Note, Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the State’s
Allocation of Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 523 (2009) (stating that one of the primary functions
of collective government is to provide security in a way that individuals could not).
12
See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM.L.REV. 1367, 1394–95
(2003) (discussing the major increase in interest in privatization of governmental powers and
the ways in which governments can give those powers to private organizations); David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1175 (1999) (detailing the major increase in private security and police forces in the United States).
8
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raised some concerns, the specific delegation of police powers has definitely been
accompanied by periods of controversy and hesitation.13 While police force privatization continues to grow, concerns remain over how such a serious power and
responsibility held by the government can be effectively and appropriately delegated
to private organizations.14
In fact, constitutional concerns over the Establishment Clause and the delegation
of police powers came to an intersection in a recent Alabama state law.15 In a bill signed
into law in June of 2019, the Alabama state legislature allowed the Briarwood Presbyterian Church, categorized as a megachurch, and its academic campus to create
and maintain a police force.16 The bill was drafted in response to the church’s request,17
which was originally presented to the Alabama state legislature several years earlier,
but failed to garner the support necessary for approval twice.18 In the original request,
officials from Briarwood indicated that although they had private security in the
form of off-duty police officers from neighboring police departments, the recent
increase in school and church shootings led them to believe that actual church police
officers were necessary for safety and security.19 Despite the failure of the church’s
initial requests, its latest attempt was successful, and the Briarwood organizations,
as well as a second private Christian school, now have the ability to create and maintain a private police force of trained and licensed officers.20
This new Alabama law creates a relationship between a religious organization and
a traditionally governmental power that certainly raises the potential for Establishment
13

See Enion, supra note 11, at 538–41 (describing multiple periods of congressional
concern stemming from private police enforcement of racist policies in the South after the
Civil War, and misconduct in various labor disputes over the years).
14
See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1275 (highlighting the challenges that privatization of police forces might create for criminal procedure and private abuse).
15
See Richard Gonzales, New Alabama Law Permits Church to Hire Its Own Police Force,
NPR, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/20/734591147/new-alabama-law-permits-church-to-hire
-its-own-police-force [https://perma.cc/4554-R5G3] (last updated June 21, 2019, 11:11 AM);
Jasmine Hyman & Brian Ries, An Alabama Megachurch Will Form Its Own Police Force After
Passage of Controversial Law, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/21/politics/alabama-mega
church-police-force-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/2WTK-Z974] (last updated June 21, 2019,
5:02 PM); Ivey Signs Law Allowing Church to Hire Police Force, AP NEWS (June 19, 2019),
https://www.apnews.com/c09feda825c441289bf14b996580dfc5 [https://perma.cc/C8YT-A9FS].
16
See Gonzales, supra note 15; Hyman & Ries, supra note 15; AP NEWS, supra note 15.
17
See Leada Gore, Ivey Signs Law Allowing Briarwood Church, School, Madison
Academy to Form Police Forces, AL.COM, https://www.al.com/news/2019/06/ivey-signs-law
-allowing-briarwood-church-school-madison-academy-to-form-police-forces.html [https://
perma.cc/U7HA-ZXHP] (last updated June 21, 2019).
18
See Hanno van der Bijl & Virginia Martin, Briarwood Presbyterian Church Police
Department Bill Died for Lack of Action in the Legislature, BIRMINGHAMWATCH (May 20,
2017), https://birminghamwatch.org/briarwood-presbyterian-church-police-department-bill
-died-for-lack-of-action-in-the-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/8JFT-RYSM].
19
See id.
20
See Hyman & Ries, supra note 15; Gore, supra note 17.
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Clause questions.21 The law generates two separate issues that concern Establishment Clause doctrine. First, would a police department established and maintained
by a church violate the Establishment Clause? The second, and potentially more
nuanced, question is: would a police department established and maintained by a
religious academy violate the Establishment Clause? In order to answer both questions, this Note first briefly examines the history surrounding the Establishment
Clause.22 Next, it considers changing trends in who holds police powers.23 Additionally, this Note touches on how courts have come to analyze Establishment Clause
issues and the appropriate standards to apply.24 Finally, it shows through analysis of
the recently passed Alabama law that the Establishment Clause should bar Alabama
from delegating police powers to the Briarwood Presbyterian Church, Briarwood
Christian School, and Madison Academy.25
I. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE FORMATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
When attempting to create the Bill of Rights, religious concerns weighed heavily
upon the minds of the Framers.26 Prior to that point, government and religion were
frequently strongly intertwined.27 For centuries in much of Europe, the Roman Catholic Church dominated religion and was enforced and supported by governments
from the top all the way down to the local levels of government.28 Likewise, secular
rulers were often involved in the selection of the local Church hierarchy.29 After the
Protestant Reformation began, certain beliefs were no longer outright heretical, and
government selection and enforcement of religion became even more involved.30
During the reign of the Holy Roman Empire, the Peace of Augsburg left the determination of the region’s religion up to the ruler of that particular area.31 In England,
Henry VIII used acts of Parliament to officially establish a new Protestant religion.32
21

See Gonzales, supra note 15; Hyman & Ries, supra note 15; AP NEWS, supra note 15.
See infra Part I.
23
See infra Part II.
24
See infra Part III.
25
See infra Part IV.
26
See LEVY, supra note 2, at 79 (“Although the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not rank
the rights in order of importance, some are more precious than others. A right that has no
superior is the first mentioned: freedom from a law respecting an establishment of religion.”).
27
See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND
FAIRNESS 18 (2008) (“In Western civilization through most of the eighteenth century, governments with official religions restricted the free exercise of nonmembers.”).
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
See Sascha O. Becker et al., Causes and Consequences of the Protestant Reformation,
ESI WORKING PAPERS 2016, at 29–30 (“At Augsburg, the Imperial Diet famously agreed on
the principle of ‘whose rule, his religion’ (cuius regio, eius religio) whereby local rulers
decided the religious affiliation on behalf of their citizens.”).
32
See id. at 34.
22
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In doing so, Henry VIII severed the old legitimacy of rule coming from the Church, and
subjugated the new Protestant church under the control of the English Parliament.33
Changes in religious power structures led to various conflicts34 and lengthy
periods of government persecution, which often alternated between which group was
being tormented.35 In England specifically, the people saw various degrees of government persecution change drastically upon the ascension of three different monarchs
in a row.36 Henry VIII established changes to Catholicism and created a new church,
but continued some degree of persecution against certain Protestants.37 His son, Edward
VI, was able to stop some of those persecutions, and instead Catholics in certain
areas began to be jailed.38 Finally, Edward’s successor, Mary I, returned Catholicism
in force, and persecution of Protestants recommenced.39 These practices of persecution
would continue and fluctuate for many years to come,40 which certainly weighed
heavily upon the minds of the Framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.41
The fact that the new constitution remained silent on connections between religion and government was a substantial issue for many of the Framers.42 The absence
of certain guarantees, such as a guarantee against the establishment of religion,
prompted certain delegates and states to require the formation of a promise, “characterized . . . as a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement,’” to address the issues later, without which
the Constitution likely would not have been ratified.43 Indeed, the very discussions in
Congress surrounding the passage of the Bill of Rights show the degree of importance
that the legislature afforded the First Amendment and the degree of disagreement
33

See id. (discussing how Henry VIII tied the new Church to the power of his government).
See generally, e.g., id., at 4, 7, 13 (discussing broadly some of the Reformation-based
conflicts that occurred in the Holy Roman Empire).
35
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HAIGH, ENGLISH REFORMATIONS: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY UNDER THE TUDORS 187 (1993) (explaining persecutions under Henry VIII of Protestants deemed heretical, and how under Edward VI Protestant persecution declined and
Catholics were jailed); GEOFFERY TREASURE, THE HUGUENOTS 3 (2013) (describing how
French Protestants were persecuted, “[w]ith varying degrees of intensity and periods of
remission . . . from the start”).
36
See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
37
See HAIGH, supra note 35, at 105.
38
See id. at 187.
39
See id. at 205–08.
40
See id.
41
See GREENAWALT, supra note 27, at 19 (discussing how persecution continued and
remained despite the Toleration Act of 1689 and how laws prohibiting Catholicism and
Judaism remained until the nineteenth century).
42
See LEVY, supra note 2, at 80 (“The clause was added to the Constitution because the
unamended text not only placed religious liberty in jeopardy; it seemed to allow for the
implication that Congress might exercise powers not prohibited and might, therefore, create
an establishment of religion . . . .”).
43
See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 83–84 (2005).
34
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that was present.44 On June 8, 1789, James Madison originally proposed to the House
of Representatives that there be an amendment reading, “The civil rights of none shall
be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or
on any pretext infringed.”45 By the end of July, the debate shifted to consider the language of: “No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of
conscience be infringed.”46 While multiple alternative versions of language were
proposed over the debate period, Madison fought to ensure that the Amendment did
not simply prohibit the establishment of a national religion, but rather that the
government would not establish nor support a religion in any capacity.47
Although it took many years to reach the Supreme Court in debate, the Everson
Court looked back to the history of these discussions, and seemingly sided with
Madison, declaring that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibited governments from passing any laws that could “aid” or “prefer” any religion.48
Despite continued disagreement in the courts about the exact meaning of the Establishment Clause’s wording,49 the lessons of history and fears of the Framers surely
indicate the continued importance of the Clause’s protections.50
II. GOVERNMENT DELEGATION OF POLICE POWERS
One of the ways in which the courts have determined that states or the federal
government can violate the Establishment Clause is through the delegation of powers
that are typically held by a government actor.51 This presents a potential problem, as
there is a currently growing trend of delegating government powers to private actors.52
When delegating government powers to private actors, some of the constitutional
44

See generally NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES,
SOURCES, [AND] ORIGINS 1–13 (2d ed. 2015) (detailing the floor debates in the House of
Representatives and the Senate, as well as input from various states, on the drafting of what
would become the First Amendment).
45
Id. at 1.
46
Id. at 2.
47
See LEVY, supra note 2, at 85.
48
330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947); see also COGAN, supra note 44, at 1.
49
See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2079–80 (2019) (indicating that the wording of the First Amendment created long-lasting interpretation issues).
50
See supra Part I.
51
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 699 (1994) (“Where ‘fusion’ is an issue,
the difference lies in the distinction between a government’s purposeful delegation on the
basis of religion and a delegation on principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose
religious identities are incidental to their receipt of civic authority.”).
52
Metzger, supra note 12, at 1369 (“Privatization is now virtually a national obsession.
Hardly any domestic policy issue remains untouched by disputes over the scope of private
participation in government . . . .”).
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restraints and protections associated with the action can be removed.53 The potential
“undermin[ing] [of] constitutional accountability”54 by delegation is troubling in any
field, but should particularly concern American citizens when it applies to the delegation of powers that are critical to their personal liberties, such as police powers.55
The growing trend in the privatization of government powers has certainly not
skipped police powers.56 A massive number of private actors and agencies now employ
private police forces.57 In fact, an article from over twenty years ago noted that,
“[t]he private security industry already employs significantly more guards, patrol
personnel, and detectives than the federal, state, and local governments combined, and
the disparity is growing.”58 Unlike some of the other recent trends in privatizing
government powers, the delegation of police powers to private actors is not a new
practice.59 However, the lengthy history of the private exercise of police powers can
provide multiple reasons for caution and concern.60
Police powers are, at least to some degree, consistently historically linked to
government actors.61 Prior to the American colonial age, police powers in England were
held firmly by royalty.62 As far back as 1285, English kings created a system of sheriffs to serve as formal wielders of the sovereign’s power to police.63 During the
founding of the United States, theories of the state advocated that the government
should have “certain responsibilities that, by their collective nature, cannot be left
solely to the individual.”64 Chief among those responsibilities would be collective
security.65 Yet, almost from the very beginning, American law enforcement included
elements of “private detective agencies and watchmen services.”66 While these private
police actors provided protection in areas where public police forces were slow to take
root, they also frequently raised scandals and concerns.67 In the early days of American
policing, private forces drew negative attention by maintaining relationships with
53

See id. at 1369–70.
Id. at 1377.
55
See id. at 1377, 1380.
56
See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the State, 13
IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 357, 358 (2006) (“What do Disneyland, the Abu Ghraib U.S.
military prison, the Mall of America, and the Y-12 nuclear security complex in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee have in common? . . . [E]ach employs private police.”).
57
See id.
58
Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1168.
59
See Enion, supra note 11, at 521 (discussing how “throughout history and into today,
states have relied on a mix of public and private organizations to supply force”).
60
See infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.
61
See Enion, supra note 11, at 524.
62
See id. at 529.
63
See id. at 531–32.
64
Id. at 523.
65
See id.
66
Joh, supra note 56, at 360–61.
67
See infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
54
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criminals and using “questionable methods” to gain information or silence complaints.68 Additionally, the reputation of private police agencies suffered even more
during the late nineteenth century when they were frequently used as labor enforcers.69
Agencies like the Pinkertons were used as “strike guards, ‘scabs’ (substitute workers),
undercover agents, and ‘strike missionaries.’”70 Criticism for private police force usage
as labor enforcers reached a peak in 1892 when mistaken identities led to a shootout
between workers and Pinkerton guards, leaving ten people dead.71 After this, congressional hearings were called to address the concerning practices of private policing.72
Despite widespread criticism and condemnation from Congress in the late nineteenth century,73 private policing has continued to play a major role in the United
States.74 The likely reason that private police forces survived, despite heavy criticism,
was a shift to filling more cooperative, guard-like roles.75 As public police forces
shifted from “preventive patrol” to “detection and apprehension,” private police forces
began to take the exact opposite approach, creating a mirrored switch in roles.76 In
this process, private police forces seemingly assumed a partnership with public police
forces, to fill necessary and vacated roles.77
However, in order for private police to serve a cooperative role with public
police, they must have some form of authorization for their ability to act.78 In some
cases, typically including university police, the delegation of power occurs by statute.79 Yet, there is often significant variance amongst these state statutes,80 and some
delegations only grant private police “the search and arrest powers of ordinary
citizens.”81 This is not typically the case, however, and in many scenarios, “private
68

Joh, supra note 56, at 362–64.
Id. at 364.
70
Id.
71
See id. at 365.
72
Id. at 366.
73
Id.
74
See id. at 368 (discussing how the next few decades after the Homestead riot were
actually considered “a ‘golden age’ of the private police”).
75
See Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1220 (“Some of what looked like retreat, however, was
actually redeployment: Pinkerton and its rivals were turning from detective firms that also
provided guards into security guard companies that offered detective services on the side.”).
76
See id.
77
See Joh, supra note 56, at 376–77 (explaining how, after federal studies, some scholars
theorized that private police forces served as partial or potentially full partners to public police).
78
See Enion, supra note 11, at 526–27 (discussing the various roles in which private
police forces may exercise policing powers, and what powers governments must grant them
in order for them to do so).
79
See Leigh J. Jahnig, Under School Colors: Private University Police as State Actors
Under § 1983, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 249, 250 (2015) (explaining how university police are often
granted their policing powers by state statute).
80
Id.
81
Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1183.
69
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guards . . . are ‘deputized’ or otherwise given full or partial police powers by state
or local enactment.”82
Given the historical ties that policing powers have to sovereigns,83 and serious
examples of past abuse of private police authority,84 governments should consider
the allocation of policing powers to be a very serious delegation. While the levels
of power delegated seem to vary, caution seems especially prudent in cases where
higher levels of power, such as the authority to make arrests and seizures, have been
delegated.85 When considering the police force authorized by Alabama House Bill
309, it is certain that the force would be a private police force, and would be granted
at least partial police powers, such as the authority to make arrests.86 Therefore,
Alabama’s delegation of police powers to a private force should warrant a careful
consideration of the potential impacts, including potential constitutional issues.87
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ISSUES
As the Supreme Court has pointed out, interpreting the Establishment Clause
“has proved to be a vexing problem” for many decades now.88 While the Establishment Clause was first applied to the states with the Fourteenth Amendment,89
Everson v. Board of Education was the first case to attempt to examine that application in 1947.90 In Everson, the Court attempted to set out the minimum boundaries
of what the Establishment Clause should mean, while acknowledging a history of
“broad interpretation” of the clause.91 Several years later, the Court in Walz v. Tax
Commission referenced the Court’s earlier discussion of the history of the Establishment Clause in Everson, and stated that it was “sufficient to note that for the men
who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the ‘establishment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity.”92 Finally, just a year later in 1971, the Supreme Court compiled the doctrine from Everson, Walz, and other First Amendment cases93 from the
82

Id. at 1183–84.
See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
84
See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
85
See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
86
See H.B. 309, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019) (allowing the Briarwood Presbyterian
Church, its religious academy, and the religious Madison Academy the power to employ
their own police force with the power to make arrests and carry non-lethal weapons).
87
See Ala. H.B. 309.
88
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2079–80 (2019).
89
See id. at 2096 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572
U.S. 565, 607, 609–10 (2014)).
90
See id. at 2080.
91
330 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1947).
92
397 U.S. 664, 667–68 (1970).
93
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971) (discussing other cases such as
83
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intervening years in an attempt to make a single multi-factor test that could be applied
to all Establishment Clause issues: the Lemon test.94
A. The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman was presented with two state statutes,
one from Pennsylvania and one from Rhode Island, that “provid[ed] state aid to
church-related elementary and secondary schools.”95 In determining the constitutionality of the state statutes when pitted against the Establishment Clause, the Court
lamented the vagueness of the Establishment Clause’s language stating, “[t]he language
of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque, particularly when
compared with other portions of the Amendment.”96 Particularly troublesome for the
Court was the Amendment’s use of the language: “[N]o law respecting an establishment of religion.”97 The Court discussed the difficulty of including the word “respecting,” asserting:
A law may be one “respecting” the forbidden objective while
falling short of its total realization. A law “respecting” the proscribed result, that is, the establishment of religion, is not always
easily identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A given law
might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one “respecting” that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to
such establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.98
In order to handle the ambiguity of the Establishment Clause’s language, the Court
created a three-pronged test that could be applied to all Establishment Clause cases
in order to show infringement on the three areas of constitutional protection denoted by
the Walz Court.99 The first prong is intended to test whether the statute in question
“ha[s] a secular legislative purpose.”100 The second prong is to determine whether
that statute’s “principal or primary effect . . . advances [or] inhibits religion.”101 Finally,
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952);
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
94
See id. at 611–13 (discussing the three tests, compiled from previous court cases,
which should be applied to test Establishment Clause issues).
95
Id. at 606.
96
Id. at 612.
97
See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1).
98
Id.
99
See id. at 612–13.
100
Id. at 612.
101
Id.
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the third prong is meant to test whether the statute would “foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’”102 Ultimately, while acknowledging that
total separation of church and state is not required or completely possible,103 the
Lemon Court found both Rhode Island and Pennsylvania’s statutes to be unconstitutional as they failed the third prong of the test and created excessive governmental
and religious entanglement.104
The test created in Lemon v. Kurtzman became the standard for future courts to
apply in all Establishment Clause cases.105 Several subsequent cases applied the test
both to uphold and invalidate various state statutes.106 In Stone v. Graham, the Court
applied the Lemon test to a Kentucky statute that required a list of the Ten Commandments be posted on the wall of every public classroom in the state.107 The Court
invalidated the statute, stating that it failed the first prong of the Lemon test, as it did
not have a secular legislative purpose.108 In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court was
presented with a Minnesota statute that provided a tax break for expenses spent on
child education.109 The petitioners challenged the statute on the basis that it essentially
provided a tax break to parents who chose to pay for their children to go to primarily
religious elementary and secondary schools.110 After applying the Lemon test, the
Court determined that the statute passed all three prongs of the test and was constitutional.111 As a final example, the Court used the Lemon test to analyze a Louisiana
statute which required that if evolutionary science was taught in public schools, it
could only be taught in tandem with “creation science.”112 The Court found that such
a statute could not have a proper secular purpose, and that after the statute failed the
first prong of the Lemon test, analysis of the other two prongs was unnecessary.113
102

Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
Id. at 614.
104
See id. at 625.
105
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582–83 (1987) (“The Establishment Clause
forbids the enactment of any law ‘respecting an establishment of religion.’ The Court has applied
a three-pronged test to determine whether legislation comports with the Establishment Clause.”)
(footnote omitted); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (citation omitted) (“The general
nature of our inquiry in this area has been guided, since the decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
by the ‘three-part’ test laid down in that case . . . .”); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40
(1980) (per curiam) (“This Court has announced a three-part test for determining whether a
challenged state statute is permissible under the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution . . . .”).
106
See, e.g., infra notes 107–13 and accompanying text.
107
Stone, 449 U.S. at 39.
108
See id. at 42–43.
109
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390.
110
See id. at 391–92.
111
See id. at 395–96, 403.
112
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987).
113
See id. at 587, 597.
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B. Shifts in the Establishment Clause Analysis
Despite the numerous cases in which the Lemon test has been applied, it is certainly not without criticism.114 Shortly after the creation of the Lemon test, in an opinion
that was very supportive of Lemon, the Court specified that the tests developed in
Lemon “must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify instances in which
the objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired.”115 In Marsh v.
Chambers, the Supreme Court was asked to consider the Nebraska legislature’s
practice of opening each day in session with a prayer from a chaplain who is paid
with state funds.116 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Lemon test and
found that the practice violated all three prongs of the test.117 However, the Supreme
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s opinion without mentioning a single concern
raised by the Lemon test.118 Instead, the Court relied entirely upon history, tradition,
and original intent.119
Although the Court in Marsh simply ignored the Lemon test, the Court in Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills School District used part of the same logic employed by the
test, without ever referencing it.120 In Zobrest, the Court examined whether the Establishment Clause would bar a school district from providing a sign-language
interpreter to a student at a private Catholic school.121 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that providing the interpreter in this scenario would violate the
Establishment Clause based on the second prong of the Lemon test.122 The Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, but never discussed the Lemon test in its
opinion.123 The decision in Zobrest, with a discussion of the Lemon test absent, came
just a few days after Scalia’s blistering criticism of the Lemon test in Lamb’s Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District.124 In his concurring opinion in Lamb’s
Chapel, Scalia described the Lemon test as being like a “ghoul in a late-night horror
114

See infra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975), overruled in part by Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 836 (2000).
116
463 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1983).
117
Id. at 785–86.
118
See id. at 792–93 (stating that the factors which the respondent suggested, and the Eighth
Circuit found, would violate the Establishment Clause were not sufficient to invalidate the
practice when “[w]eighed against the historical background”).
119
See id. at 786, 790.
120
509 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1993) (finding that the effect of the action in question would not
provide a benefit or advance the religious school in any meaningful way, but not mentioning
the second prong of the Lemon test in the process).
121
Id. at 3.
122
Id. at 3, 5.
123
See id. at 12–13 (finding the action constitutional without discussing the Lemon test).
124
See 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (decided on June 7). See generally
Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1 (decided on June 18).
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movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried.”125 Additionally, Scalia criticized that “[w]hen we wish to strike
down a practice [the Lemon test] forbids, we invoke it . . . when we wish to uphold
a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.”126
C. Current State of the Establishment Clause Analysis
Despite being intermittently ignored and receiving criticism, the Lemon test has
remained valid, and the Court even expressly refused to abandon the test in its 2005
decision of McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union.127 However, after
multiple new faces joined the Court, the decision of American Legion v. American
Humanist Association seriously calls into question the status of the Lemon test.128
In American Legion, the Court acknowledged its own usage of the Lemon test, but
pointed out the difficulties and contradictory opinions that have arisen under the
test.129 Given the challenges that the Lemon test faces, the plurality of the Court
determined that the Lemon test should no longer apply to cases “that involve the use,
for ceremonial, celebratory, or commemorative purposes, of words or symbols with
religious associations.”130 Instead, the Court essentially indicated that decisions should
be based on history and tradition in these scenarios.131 In fact, the Court stated that the
appropriate modern approach that the Court later took was “a more modest approach
that focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance.”132
Although the plurality decision criticized Lemon’s usage in some situations, the
concurring opinions were far harsher in their discussion of the test.133 Justice
Kavanaugh would see the limitations on the Lemon test expanded to all Establishment Clause inquiries, effectively invalidating the test.134 Justice Thomas indicated
that he approved of the plurality’s limitation of the Lemon test, but “would take the
logical next step and overrule the Lemon test in all contexts.”135 Finally, Justice
Gorsuch stated that he believed the Lemon test to now be “shelved.”136
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Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
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See 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005).
128
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080 (2019).
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Id. (“As Establishment Clause cases involving a great array of laws and practices came
to the Court, it became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not resolve them.”).
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Id. at 2081.
131
See id. at 2081–82.
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Id. at 2087.
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See id. at 2091–2103.
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See id. at 2091–93 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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While the decision of American Legion calls many aspects of the Lemon test
into question, the plurality’s decision did not touch on the type of Establishment
Clause issue that the delegation of police powers to a religious institution or academy would have.137 In fact, such a relationship would likely fall under the proposed
miscellaneous category of Establishment Clause interactions that the Court discussed.138 Therefore, while it is clear that the modern Supreme Court favors history,
tradition, and precedent in Establishment Clause analysis,139 the Lemon test factors
will still likely be helpful in analyzing the specific type of interactions that would be
involved in the delegation of police powers to a religious institution or academy.140
IV. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO THE STATE
ALLOCATION OF POLICING POWERS TO PRIVATE POLICE FORCES
OPERATED BY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
In passing Alabama House Bill 309, the legislature amended section 16-22-1 of
the Alabama Code to include, “Madison Academy, and Briarwood Presbyterian Church
and its integrated auxiliary Briarwood Christian School” into the list of colleges and
universities which were previously allowed to employ private police forces.141 While
the situation is not entirely unique,142 the idea that any of these organizations might
create their own private police force creates a novel interplay between government
power and religion. Given the nature of police powers and churches, the Establishment Clause should bar Alabama from delegating police powers to the Briarwood
Presbyterian Church. While the nature of religious academies may be somewhat
different depending on the specific situation, the Establishment Clause should likely
also bar Alabama from delegating police powers to the Briarwood Christian School
and Madison Academy.
137

See id. at 2081–82 (discussing the areas where the Lemon test should no longer apply).
Id. at 2081 n.16 (citations omitted) (“A final, miscellaneous category, including cases
involving such issues as Sunday closing laws and church involvement in governmental
decision making might be added.”).
139
See id. at 2087 (discussing a modern case-by-case approach to Establishment Clause
issues that is rooted in history, traditions, and precedent).
140
See id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring) (indicating that purpose and effect, essentially
the first and second prongs of the Lemon test, are still very important to considering government action in Establishment Clause scenarios); McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 545 U.S. 844, 863–64 (2005) (explaining that the purpose prong of the Lemon test should
not, and would not, be abandoned); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (discussing
the fact that factors for the effect, or second prong, of the Lemon test are often the same and
might be combined with factors of excessive government entanglement, or the third prong
of the test).
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ALA. CODE § 16-22-1 (2019); H.B. 309, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019).
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See Enion, supra note 11, at 526–27.
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A. The Delegation of Police Powers to a Church or Religious Institution:
Briarwood Presbyterian Church
1. The Lemon Test Factors
When considering if delegating the Briarwood Presbyterian Church the power
to create its own police force would violate the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test
should be considered.143 The first prong of the Lemon test asks whether the questioned statute has a secular legislative purpose.144 Alabama House Bill 309 was proposed and enacted at the request of the Briarwood Presbyterian Church for the stated
purpose of providing better safety and security.145 When discussing their initial
request to the Alabama State Legislature, officials of the church claimed that they
were concerned by a perceived increase of violence in school and church settings.146
Specifically, church administrators mentioned concerns over the Sandy Hook school
shooting and “similar assaults at churches and schools.”147 Church administrators
claimed that the church’s large size and congregation created a need for protection
that was greater than private security could provide.148
Given valid concerns of safety, the amendments to Alabama House Bill 309 could
likely be shown to have a secular purpose. While the Court in McCreary County reaffirmed the validity of the first prong of the Lemon test, it also acknowledged that the
Supreme Court had only “found government action motivated by an illegitimate purpose” four times since the Lemon test was created.149 The specific nature of the statute,
which intends to provide and allow for police protections, suggests a strong secular
purpose, even when applied to a church.150
The second and third prongs of the Lemon test attempt to determine the effect
of the statute on enhancing or inhibiting religion and the level of government entanglement that occurs as a result.151 Examination of these elements requires analysis
of the “character” and purpose of the receiving organization.152 Additionally, the
Court has asked if the effects of the statute constitute the endorsement of one religion
over another.153
143

See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612 (1971).
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Gore, supra note 17.
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Van der Bijl & Martin, supra note 18.
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See id.
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McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005).
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See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Van der Bijl & Martin, supra note 18.
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See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997) (discussing the relationship between the second and third prongs of the Lemon test and indicating that government entanglement is excessive when it serves to enhance or inhibit religion); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13
(establishing and discussing the second and third prongs of the Lemon test).
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See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232–33; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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See Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 596–97 (1989).
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Although the Court has drawn conflicting conclusions from Lemon test factors
in the past,154 surely Alabama’s delegation of police powers to the Briarwood Presbyterian Church cannot pass either of these prongs or elements of the Lemon test.155 When
discussing the character of the receiving organization, it is difficult to be more directly
connected to religion than a church. Unlike the statutes at question in Lemon, which
provided financial assistance to teachers at non-public elementary and secondary
schools,156 here, Briarwood Presbyterian Church would be directly receiving assistance
from the government.157 Although the church is not receiving financial assistance,
the fact that Briarwood is receiving the delegation of a state power is even more concerning for an analysis of effect and excessive entanglement.158 In County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court highlighted the idea that the effects of
a statute could indicate what amounted to a government endorsement of one religious group to the exclusion of others.159 In the amendments made by Alabama
House Bill 309, the Briarwood Presbyterian Church is the only church or religious
institution, besides the two Christian religious academies, to be granted the authority
to create and maintain a police force.160
The exercise of police powers is a major state responsibility and a role that was
historically held exclusively by the controlling sovereign power.161 While private
security forces have somewhat lessened that historical role, the delegation of actual
police powers, i.e., the power to arrest and detain citizens, is still closely managed.162
To grant that power to one specific religious entity, Briarwood Presbyterian Church,
screams excessive government entanglement.163 To any onlookers of other religions
or religious groups, it is clear that the Alabama state government has granted one
Christian church some of its reserved powers, and it would be difficult to say that
the grant of such an important power did not indicate a government endorsement.164
2. History and Precedent
While the plurality and concurring justices in American Legion v. American
Humanist Association stressed an Establishment Clause analysis based on history,
154

See supra Section III.A.
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13, 615.
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Id. at 606.
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See H.B. 309, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019).
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See id.; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
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492 U.S. 573, 596–97 (1989).
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Ala. H.B. 309.
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See Enion, supra note 11, at 523.
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See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
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See Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597.
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tradition, and precedent,165 Lemon test factors may still be particularly relevant in the
present scenario due to a general lack of both sets of factors discussed by the American
Legion Court.166 In fact, outside of one other possible exception at the National
Cathedral in Washington, D.C., there does not appear to be any other instances of
a church-run police force in the United States.167 As such, it would likely be rather
difficult to try to determine the historical perspective of the relationship. However,
in terms of precedent, there are two other Establishment Clause cases in which the
Supreme Court dealt with the state delegation of power to a religious organization.168
In a footnote to Justice Alito’s opinion for American Legion, Alito suggested
that Establishment Clause issues can be roughly categorized into six, possibly seven
categories.169 The potential seventh category, in Alito’s mind, would constitute a
“miscellaneous category,” notably including issues centering around “church involvement in governmental decisionmaking.”170 The Supreme Court has previously
dealt with “church involvement in governmental decisionmaking” Establishment
Clause issues in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet
and Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.171 Since a portion of the new Alabama law in question gives a church the power to make decisions regarding the use and manner in
which police powers are applied, that issue is likely best examined as an extension
of “church involvement in governmental decisionmaking.”172 Therefore, if the courts
were to analyze this Establishment Clause issue without the Lemon test, they would
most likely rely heavily upon the precedent and any traditions identified and established in Grumet and Larkin.173
In Grumet, the New York state government allowed “a religious enclave of Satmar
Hasidim, practitioners of a strict form of Judaism,” to form their own school district to
better suit the specific needs of the religious community.174 Prior to amendments to the
New York law, the enclave fell within part of the jurisdiction of a larger school district.175 However, children of the village almost exclusively attended private religious
schools.176 Ultimately, concerns over obtaining state funding and resources for services
165

See 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081–83, 2087 (2019) (stating that the Court should analyze their
case with history and tradition in mind, and citing precedent that successfully did so).
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See generally id.
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Van der Bijl & Martin, supra note 18.
168
See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2081 n.16.
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Id. at 2081 n.16.
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Id. at 2081 n.16 (citing Grumet, 512 U.S. 687; Larkin, 459 U.S. 116).
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Id.
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See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 687–88; Larkin, 459 U.S. at 116.
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Grumet, 512 U.S. at 690.
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Id.
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public schools . . . .”).
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aiding children with disabilities led the New York government to pass a bill carving
out a unique school district matching the boundaries of the religious enclave.177 In
doing so, the state gave Kiryas Joel Village the power to create “a locally elected board
of education,” which would in turn be empowered to “take such action as opening
schools and closing them, hiring teachers, prescribing textbooks, establishing disciplinary rules, and raising property taxes to fund operations.”178
In determining Establishment Clause issues for Grumet, the lower courts relied
upon the factors established in Lemon; however, the Supreme Court focused on elements established by Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.179 Larkin presented the Court with
a scenario in which Massachusetts churches and schools were given what amounted
to veto powers over applications for liquor licenses from businesses within a certain
distance from the church or school.180 The Court found this particular Establishment
Clause issue to be fairly clear-cut and severe.181 Chief Justice Burger stated in his
opinion for the eight-to-one Court that, “[t]he challenged statute thus enmeshes
churches in the processes of government and . . . . [o]rdinary human experience and
a long line of cases teach that few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit
of the Constitution.”182 Additionally, Justice Souter later commented in Grumet that,
“Larkin presented an example of united civic and religious authority, an establishment rarely found in such straightforward form in modern America.”183
While the Court applied the Lemon test in its Establishment Clause analysis in
Larkin, it also identified other considerations unique to this particular scenario.184
Most importantly, Larkin flagged the difficulty of having a power delegated to a
religious organization without clear limitations or standards.185 Since the Court had not
had a chance to deal with an Establishment Clause issue concerning the delegation of
an important governmental power, they were especially disturbed that the state gave the
power without setting clear limitations or rules.186 The Larkin Court held this as informative of the second prong of the Lemon test, yet the Court in Grumet used the
same logic without specific reference to the Lemon test.187 In Grumet, the Court shared
177

See id.
Id.
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See id. at 703–04, 707 (discussing some of the factors that the Court in Larkin
examined, and the similarities between the fact-patterns of the cases).
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Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 117 (1982).
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Grumet, 512 U.S. at 697.
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See id. at 125.
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See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 703–04 (reviewing the relevant factors, and the elements
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Larkin’s concern about a power grant that lacked standards, but was more concerned
with the state’s, rather than the religious group’s, actions.188 The manner in which the
state of New York granted some of its governmental powers to the Kiryas Joel Village
made judicial review of the action very difficult and gave no standards or guarantees
“that the next similarly situated group seeking a school district of its own will receive
one.”189 Therefore, despite looking at different parties, both Grumet and Larkin found
that statutes granting major governmental powers to a religious group violated the
Establishment Clause, in part due to a lack of clear standards or guarantees that the
delegated powers would be given or used in a religiously neutral fashion.190
If the courts would find the proposed amendments of Alabama House Bill 309
created a delegation of important governmental power or “church involvement in
governmental decisionmaking,”191 then Grumet and Larkin both suggest that the new
version of the Alabama law would be unconstitutional.192 In Grumet, the Court stated
that the delegation of the power to create and manage a school district “delegates a
power this Court has said ‘ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.’”193 Larkin
went even further, suggesting that “the statute, by delegating a governmental power
to religious institutions, inescapably implicates the Establishment Clause.”194 The
history of police powers and their inherent relationship with the governing sovereigns
indicates that power delegation by Alabama in this case is certainly significant and
of great importance.195 While Grumet suggests that at least the legislative functions
behind education constitute one of the primary state powers,196 history indicates that
police powers are just as critical a function, if not more, of the state.197 Additionally,
the Court in both Grumet and Larkin felt that insufficient steps were taken to provide
standards and safeguards against uneven enforcement or application in the questioned
considered in Larkin, but not listing or stating the three-pronged Lemon test outside of how
the lower courts ruled); Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123–26 (performing the Lemon analysis).
188
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 703.
189
Id.
190
See id. at 710 (finding the New York statute unconstitutional, in part because the New
York legislature failed to show that there were any steps or standards to protect against
“religious favoritism”); Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125–26 (declaring the Massachusetts statute
unconstitutional, in part because it has no standards or rules to guarantee that the delegation
of power would be applied neutrally by the receiving religious institution).
191
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081 n.16 (2019) (citing
generally to Larkin, 459 U.S. 116).
192
See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 709–10; Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.
193
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 709–10 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)).
194
Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123.
195
See Enion, supra note 11, at 523 (detailing how policing powers arose as an exercise
of the governing sovereign and have remained tied to sovereigns).
196
See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 709–10 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213).
197
See Enion, supra note 11, at 523–25 (arguing that even if the state delegates or relinquishes some of its policing powers, the ultimate power and responsibility should remain
with the state).
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statutes.198 In the Alabama law, there are arguably some standards,199 but not the type
that would alleviate the Court’s fears.200 After the amendments of Alabama House Bill
309, Alabama Code section 16-22-1 provides that the officers employed under that
section will have all the powers of police officers, including the power to make
arrests.201 Additionally, those officers are to be trained in the use of non-lethal weapons,
and “certified through the Alabama Peace Officers’ Standards and Training Commission.”202 While the certification and training requirements may somewhat limit an
included organization’s ability to hire certain people, these personnel requirements have
essentially no effect on how the empowered organization can choose to use the
governmental delegation or how the government can decide to make the delegation
in the first place.203
In Larkin, the Court was concerned that there were no standards or limitations
on how churches could veto liquor license applications.204 The churches could veto
businesses’ applications for solely religious purposes or to promote an adherence to
one faith over another.205 That same concern should weigh heavily upon the courts
in the context of the Alabama statute. Given Briarwood’s stated security concerns,206
what is to stop a police employee of the church from handling church members or
people of a certain faith differently than others in the community regarding something like criminal trespassing or vandalism? Just like the statute in Larkin, even
assuming “that churches would act in good faith,” the Alabama statute granting church
authorities policing powers does not “require that churches’ power be used in a religiously neutral way,” and therefore, is likely unconstitutional.207
Lastly, similar to Grumet, the Alabama statute in question contains no standards
or guarantees from the Alabama legislature that “foreclose religious favoritism.”208
198

See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 709–10 (indicating that the way in which the New York legislature granted Kiryas Joel Village the state power did not include safeguards or efforts to
ensure religious neutrality); Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125–26 (discussing how the Massachusetts
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See ALA. CODE § 16-22-1 (2019).
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See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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ALA. CODE § 16-22-1(a) (2019); H.B. 309, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019) (amending
language as “including the power of arrest for unlawful acts committed on the property”).
202
ALA. CODE § 16-22-1(c) (2019).
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Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 710 (1994); see ALA. CODE § 16-22-1 (2019)
(including only the institutions granted the power, not why and how a determination of
eligibility to receive the power would occur).
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The Court in Grumet found it constitutionally impermissible for the State of New
York to grant Kiryas Joel Village the delegation of state power that they did without
ensuring that the power grant was done in a neutral way.209 Instead, when New York
delegated the governmental powers, they granted it only to the village.210 There was
no indication or guarantee that any similarly situated group in the future would be able
to receive the same power grant.211 The Alabama statute is slightly distinguishable
from the New York statute in Grumet, but still raises some of the same reasons for
concern. Briarwood Presbyterian Church, Briarwood Christian School, and Madison
Academy were all given the authority to create a private police force under Alabama
House Bill 309; however, Briarwood Presbyterian Church and Christian School are
considered together in the wording of the bill.212 While any of the three religious
organizations receiving the delegation of state police powers may be troublesome, the
Briarwood Presbyterian Church is the sole house of worship that is granted police
powers.213 Alabama Code section 16-22-1 already existed as a statute granting state
policing powers to colleges, universities, and the Alabama Institute for Deaf and
Blind.214 There are no standards or indications espoused for why a religious house
of worship would be included with colleges and universities, and more importantly,
no guarantees that a significantly similarly situated organization of a different faith
or background would be granted the same delegation of powers.215 Therefore, under
the logic of Grumet, the Alabama statute is likely unconstitutional as written.216
B. The Delegation of Police Powers to a Religious Academy: Briarwood
Christian School and Madison Academy
1. The Lemon Test Factors
While the delegation of police powers to a religious school may be a closer
issue, it still carries many of the same constitutional concerns, and a violation of the
209

See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 703–04, 709–10 (highlighting the ways in which the New
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highlighting the addition of three new religious organizations, two of which were listed as
a school or academy, and one of which, Briarwood Presbyterian Church, was listed as a
church or house of worship).
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See ALA. CODE § 16-22-1 (2015).
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Establishment Clause should be tested by the Lemon test. For part one of the Lemon
test, courts analyze whether the statute has a secular purpose.217 When discussing
their petitions to the Alabama State Legislature, the administrators from Briarwood
did not draw a distinction between reasons that the school or church might have for
requiring a private police force.218 However, in their discussion, administrators mentioned that they were concerned over the Sandy Hook shooting, and that they had
2,000 students attending their religious school.219 Additionally, administrators raised
concerns that they were unable to develop relationships with the constantly changing
off-duty officers.220 Staff from Madison Academy have not commented on their
reasons for seeking out a private police department.221
While previous analysis suggests that it is likely Briarwood Presbyterian Church
would be able to prove that there was a secular purpose to the amended Alabama
Code section 16-22-1,222 it would likely be even easier to prove a secular purpose
in regard to the religious schools. Protection of children and school environments
is a very real governmental concern, and the Court even addressed that issue in
Everson v. Board of Education.223 There, the Court indicated that it would be an
impermissible disadvantage to deprive religious schools of “such general government
services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal,
public highways and sidewalks.”224 While providing ordinary police protection and
granting the religious schools the power to hire and employ their own police protection are two wildly different scenarios,225 the simple fact that school police protection is a government interest likely means that the Briarwood School and Madison
Academy could prove that the amendments in Alabama House Bill 309 have a
sufficiently secular purpose.226
The character and nature of the schools become much more important for
determining the second and third prongs of the Lemon test: effect and impermissible
217
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See id. at 17 (failing to distinguish between state-provided police and school-employed
police).
226
See McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 859, 862, 864; Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
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entanglement.227 While a church, such as the Briarwood Presbyterian Church, may
clearly be a religious institution, a religious school might be less clear because of the
multiple roles which it could assume.228 The Briarwood Christian School states that
it teaches students “a variety of disciplines, along with . . . invit[ing] [them] to become
a member of clubs, sports teams, and involved in the arts.”229 However, the school
also states that it has “a highly qualified and enthusiastic faculty who are passionate and
actively engaged in communicating God’s truth to students through Christ-centered
instruction.”230 The Madison Academy lists its educational approach as “providing
academic opportunities that both challenge elite students and develop emerging students. We encourage collaboration and sharpen critical thinking skills.”231 However,
the Academy also states, “[w]e provide a balanced approach to education built on
a spiritual foundation. A Christian education provides a context for information. It
begins with the understanding that we exist to serve others and our creator.”232 Given
the schools’ stated approaches, they seem very likely to have enough religious motivation to count as religious institutions.233
Over the course of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court has indicated
that schools can be touched by varying levels of religious interest.234 In Tilton v.
Richardson, the Court discussed potential differences between religiously affiliated
universities or colleges and religious elementary and primary schools.235 Tilton
reasserted the opinion expressed in Walz, stating, “[t]he ‘affirmative if not dominant
policy’ of the instruction in pre-college church schools is ‘to assure future adherents
to a particular faith by having control of their total education at an early age.’”236
Conversely, the Tilton Court suggested that there might have been some “substance
to the contention that college students are less impressionable and less susceptible
227
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to religious indoctrination.”237 Finally, the Court reasoned that “[t]he skepticism of
the college student is not an inconsiderable barrier to any attempt or tendency to
subvert the congressional objectives and limitations. Furthermore, by their very nature,
college and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal disciplines.”238
Comparing the Court’s treatment of religious schools in Tilton and Walz illustrates some of the issues that affect the character and nature of the organization that
is receiving power from the government.239 While Tilton found that there may be
fewer reasons to be concerned with government entanglement in religiously affiliated colleges and universities,240 the Walz discussion of elementary and secondary
schools suggests more reasons to be concerned about the effect of the statute and
governmental entanglement.241 As such, Court precedent, and the schools’ own descriptions, indicate that they would likely be considered religious institutions.242 As
the schools would likely be found to be religious institutions, the delegation of
significant police powers would create an impermissible entanglement between
government and religious actions.243
2. History and Precedent
Regardless of whether the delegation of governmental police powers is given
to a church or a religious school, Grumet and Larkin are still the most applicable
cases for considering Supreme Court precedent and history.244 In considering how
the Court may apply standards from Grumet and Larkin to the religious school-run
private police forces, many of the relevant factors are likely the same as in the
previous analysis of the Alabama statute’s delegation of powers to the Briarwood
Church.245 The critical factor that may differ is the Alabama legislature’s actions in
delegating the police powers to religious schools.246
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Alabama Code section 16-22-1, prior to the amendments of Alabama House Bill
309, codified Alabama’s statute for granting policing powers to educational institutions.247 Alabama House Bill 309 amended the existing statute to include both the
Briarwood Christian School and Madison Academy,248 which is also a Christian
faith-based school.249 As opposed to the singular act of delegating police powers to
a religious house of worship that House Bill 309 accomplishes in granting policing
powers to Briarwood Presbyterian Church, the grant of policing powers to Briarwood
Christian School or Madison Academy could be said to simply be an extension of
the grants given to other educational institutions.250 Contrast this situation with
Grumet.251 Both the statute in Grumet and the amendments made by Alabama House
Bill 309 delegated power to a religious institution without clear standards or rules
as to how the power was given.252 However, the delegation in Grumet was notable as
it was a singular and unprecedented action.253 In fact, the Court noted that the New
York legislature had even previously viewed such an action with disfavor.254 Conversely, the grant of governmental powers to Briarwood Christian School and Madison
Academy was part of a similar scheme of extending private police forces to various
educational institutions.255 While this factor seems to draw a distinction, albeit a
seemingly small one, between Grumet and the delegation of police powers to the
two religious schools, other courts have had a chance to weigh in on this issue.256
3. State Decisions on Federal Constitutionality
While the issue has not yet reached federal courts, several state courts have
confronted the challenge of granting state police powers to religious schools.257 In
247
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North Carolina, the state supreme court was called upon to determine whether a
campus police officer for a religious institution could legitimately and constitutionally wield the police powers of the state and make an arrest.258 The criminal defendant, Pendleton, was arrested for driving while impaired on a public highway near
the university.259 Additionally, it was uncontested that “Campbell University is
closely affiliated with the Baptist State Convention of North Carolina.”260 The North
Carolina Superior Court granted a motion to dismiss by Pendleton as the state statute
delegating the police powers was thought to be unconstitutional.261 While the court
of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision after applying the Lemon test, the
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
reinstating the superior court’s grant of dismissal.262 The state supreme court rested
its decision both on a finding that the North Carolina statute handling police powers
delegation was unconstitutional, and that the university did not contest the facts that
indicated it was a religious institution.263 The North Carolina statute indicates that
“[a]ny educational institution . . . whether State or private,”264 can petition the
Attorney General to assign and appoint police officers to the institution.265 Furthermore, the officer would “possess all the powers of municipal and county police to
make arrests for felonies and misdemeanors and to charge for infractions on property owned or controlled by their employers.”266 Finally, the officers would also
have authority to exercise police powers on “the public roads passing through or
immediately adjoining the property of the employer.”267
The questioned statute reads similarly to Alabama Code section 16-22-1 in several
ways. First, and most significantly, the North Carolina statute gave the officers in
question the power to make arrests.268 Alabama Code section 16-22-1 also vests
officers “with all the powers of police officers, including the power of arrest.”269
Additionally, Alabama Code section 16-22-1 goes further than the unconstitutional
North Carolina Code in that it allows the named organizations to “appoint and
employ” officers automatically, without any request to the state attorney general to
assign officers.270 On the other hand, the North Carolina statute allowed officers to
exercise their powers on roads “passing through or immediately adjoining the property
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
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of the employer.”271 The Alabama statute only grants authority to make arrests based
upon “unlawful acts committed on the property.”272 While the state court decisions
of North Carolina would have no binding effect on the federal or Alabama courts,
the North Carolina Supreme Court was considering the issue as a violation of federal
constitutional law, and the analysis used, the Lemon test, should suggest a similar
outcome if appropriately applied.273 There are certainly variations between the two
statutes, but the features that they share suggest that there is strong reason to believe
Alabama Code section 16-22-1, as applied to a religious university, could present
serious Establishment Clause issues.274
There are several additional factors to consider in State v. Pendleton.275 First, in
State v. Jordan, the North Carolina Court of Appeals followed the same logic used
in Pendleton and determined that the statute there was also unconstitutional.276 The
court noted, however, that the finding should be held very narrowly to the school in
question, as the decision was based upon the sufficiency of evidence to suggest that
the university in question was a religious institution.277 There, the university was
“affiliated and sponsored by the Western Carolina Conference of the United Methodist Church. . . . [The] mission [was to be] a ‘model church related institution preparing servant leaders for life long learning’ and . . . ‘encourage[d] Christian values
within the context of its educational goals.’”278 Additionally, “[t]he university’s . . .
governing body, must have at least six of its 44 members from the Women’s
Missionary Society of the Western Carolina Conference of the United Methodist
Church.”279 Further conditions and controls were placed upon the university’s governing body, requiring, “[t]he director of the Council of the Western Carolina Conference of the United Methodist Church . . . to be a member of the Board of Trustees
[and] . . . the names of newly elected trustees [be] submitted to the . . . Conference . . .
for approval.”280 Finally, the university “closes its administrative officers [sic] every
Wednesday morning so that employees may attend chapel services . . . [u]ndergraduate
students may obtain cultural credits toward graduation by attending those same
services . . . [and] [s]tudents must take at least two courses in religion, Christian
education, or philosophy.”281 The North Carolina courts considered the issue again
271
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in State v. Yencer.282 There, the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged the
holdings of Pendleton and Jordan, but held that the controlling statute had since
been changed, placing more restrictions on the delegated police powers, and this
additional step toward neutrality meant that the statute was no longer unconstitutional.283 By adding steps such as: setting training standards, enforcing certification
requirements, requiring reports, inspecting records, conducting investigations, and
revoking certifications for violations,284 North Carolina made the statute sufficiently
neutral to avoid violating the Establishment Clause in this case.285 Additionally, the
court found that the university in question was not a religious institution.286 Since
the university’s board and policy decisions were not directly influenced by the church
organization with which the school was affiliated, and no evidence was presented
to the contrary, it was assumed that the university was not a religious institution.287
Yencer suggests that the level of restrictions that a state’s statutory delegation
of police powers puts in place may result in a potential violation of the Establishment Clause.288 The restraint factors present in Yencer in some ways exceed and in
some ways fall short of the restraints put in place by Alabama Code section 16-22-1.289
In Yencer, the officers were ultimately responsible to the North Carolina Attorney
General for reports, training, certifications, and investigations into their conduct.290
Under Alabama Code section 16-22-1, officers are not directly responsible to any
other office besides their employer.291 While officers are required under Alabama
Code section 16-22-1 to “be certified through the Alabama Peace Officers’ Standards and Training Commission,” and have certain types of training,292 there is no
mention of an office that oversees these requirements, investigates the officers’
actions, revokes or suspends their license if they are in violation, or inspects and
reviews reports.293 However, officers under Alabama Code section 16-22-1 are only
permitted to carry non-lethal weapons, whereas the North Carolina statute does not
mandate such a restriction.294 Additionally, officers authorized to act under the
Alabama Code only have authority extending to unlawful acts committed on the
property, whereas the North Carolina statute authorizes a broader exercise of the
282
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officer’s authority.295 While the factors cut both ways, the lack of oversight under
Alabama Code section 16-22-1 suggests that the statute is more like the previous
North Carolina statute that was found to be unconstitutional than it is the current
North Carolina statute that was given more latitude by the state supreme court.296
Finally, the decision in Jordan lists multiple factors that might be considered to
show that a school was a religious institution.297 While some of the factors noted at
the university in Jordan and conditions present in the Briarwood Christian School
and Madison Academy clearly overlap, others would require a closer examination.298
However, there is a clear distinction between the Pendleton, Jordan, and Yencer cases
and the Briarwood and Madison schools. All three of the schools in the North Carolina
state cases were universities or schools of higher education.299 Both the Briarwood
and Madison schools are primary and secondary schools, not institutions of higher
education.300 As addressed earlier, the Supreme Court specifically considered differences between those types of schools in Tilton v. Richardson and determined that,
“[s]ince religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these
church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than in primary and
secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education.”301
Conversely, this means that there is a heightened concern for indoctrination in
primary and secondary schools, meaning they are more likely to be considered religious institutions than institutions of higher education with similar factors.302 Since
there are multiple factors for the Briarwood and Madison schools that are similar to
Jordan—religious mission, religious leadership, and mandatory Christian educational elements—the outcome in Jordan clearly helps to indicate, in conjunction
with Tilton, that the two schools are religious institutions for the purpose of an
Establishment Clause analysis.303
Pendleton, Jordan, and Yencer all provide elements of how state courts might
decide the Federal Establishment Clause issue as applied to private police powers
in school settings, using North Carolina laws and courts as a model.304 The factors
involved in the Alabama statute and the two schools in question appear to be
substantially similar to cases that were invalidated as unconstitutional under federal
law; thus it is highly likely that Alabama Code section 16-22-1—as it applies to the
Briarwood and Madison schools—violates the Establishment Clause.305
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CONCLUSION
American colonial history serves as a strong reminder of the potential dangers
of crossing government and religion. The Protestant Reformation threw the Western
world into religious chaos, and governments scrambled to adapt for centuries.306
Those recent memories for the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights led
them to explicitly state protections against a government establishment of religion.307
Given a lack of clarity in the wording of the First Amendment, courts have struggled with what government establishment looks like. One area that the courts have
acknowledged struggling with government establishment is the delegation of significant state powers.308 Few powers may be more significant than the state sovereigns’
interest in exercising police powers. Police powers have been tied to ruling sovereigns since the ancient kings of England.309 Early policing in America, however, saw
private police forces become significant players.310 Despite many scandals and
instances of abuse, the use of private police forces prevailed and continues to grow
today.311 Modern private police forces fill a role that public police forces may sometimes lack, and often do so with delegations of state powers. While these delegations
of police powers may vary, most of them grant private actors very significant powers
over citizens.312 Therefore, states should be very cautious about additional constitutional concerns, such as violating the Establishment Clause, when delegating these
police powers.
When trying to determine if there has been a violation of the Establishment Clause,
courts have struggled to define one consistent test.313 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the
Court created a three-pronged test to determine whether there was a clear, secular
purpose; whether the action advanced or inhibited religion; and whether the action
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created excessive entanglement.314 While the Lemon test is still an accepted test, it has
somewhat fallen out of favor due to the vagueness of some of the prongs.315 As such,
additional tests have been proposed, including in a recent case, which seems to suggest
that factors of history and tradition should be considered.316 Over the many years of
Supreme Court cases on the Establishment Clause, at least two cases, Grumet and
Larkin, have touched on the delegation of significant state powers to private organizations.317 These cases, in addition to the Lemon test, should be used to help examine
whether a delegation of state powers would violate the Establishment Clause.318
After considering the Lemon test, Grumet, Larkin, and the importance of police
powers, Alabama House Bill 309’s edit to the current statute, delegating private
police powers to educational institutions, made an unconstitutional grant of police
powers to the Briarwood Presbyterian Church.319 When considering those same
elements, in conjunction with decisions made in state courts concerning the delegation of police powers to religiously affiliated universities, the grant of private police
powers to Briarwood Christian School and Madison Academy also violates the
Establishment Clause.320 Under the Lemon test, neither the church nor the schools,
as religious institutions, can avoid excessive entanglement with government actions
while having a private police force.321 Under a history and tradition approach, and
an examination of the relevant precedent, both delegations of power reach, or extend
past, the scenarios considered in Grumet and Larkin.322 Additionally, in the context
of the schools, recent state court decisions concerning federal law suggest that a
court properly applying the Lemon test would find that these delegations of police
powers violated the Establishment Clause.323 Considering all of the factors present,
it seems certain that the police powers granted to Briarwood Presbyterian Church,
its affiliated school, and Madison Academy under Alabama House Bill 309 violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
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